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The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 is regarded as central turning point in 
nineteenth-century trade policy, inaugurating a free trade era in Western Europe. 
We reexamine this story and put it into global perspective with a new database 
covering more than 7,500 data points for 11 categories of manufactures in 41 
countries and colonies around the world between 1846 and 1880. It reveals 
that bilateralism after 1860 reinforced a process already underway before. 
Nevertheless, we highlight that trade liberalization was a global phenomenon 
over most of our period, so that the prominent British case appears as typical 
rather than exceptional. 
 
ecent bilateral or regional trade arrangements in Europe, the 
Americas, and elsewhere or GATT’s multilateral approach after 
the Second World War have renewed the debate surrounding different 
approaches to trade liberalization. In this regard, the historiography 
advances that the 1846 unilateral repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain 
was not an overwhelming success in establishing free trade. Indeed, 
according to classical accounts, the movement towards free trade only 
spread to the rest of Europe after the Anglo-French commercial treaty 
(known as Cobden-Chevalier Treaty) in 1860, mostly in the form of 
subsequent bilateral agreements between other parties.  
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 Experts in nineteenth-century trade policy like Paul Bairoch, John V. 
C. Nye, Douglas Irwin, and Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson  
argue that the Cobden-Chevalier treaty was decisive in reducing tariff 
protection by spreading bilateral agreements containing most-favored-
nation (MFN) clauses.1 For these authors, Cobden-Chevalier was the 
key episode in trade liberalization, generating a harmonious period of 
free trade that compares favorably with the period before the 1860s or 
even with the more recent GATT era.  
 Is it really true that Cobden-Chevalier was the turning point for 
nineteenth-century trade liberalization outside Britain? Authors like 
Williamson, Paul Sharp, and Giovanni Federico emphasize that 
liberalization following the repeal of the Corn Laws was not, in fact, 
exclusive to Britain. The movement to lower tariff duties on agricultural 
products actually started well before 1846.2 Robert Pahre offers an 
interesting account of the liberalizing treaties in Europe that followed 
the formation of the German Zollverein in 1834,3 although these 
bilateral approaches were mostly focused on establishing “freedom of 
commerce,” that is, the possibility to trade internationally on more or 
less equal terms and reducing discrimination in shipping and related 
aspects of trading. Recently, Olivier Accominotti and Marc Flandreau 
have cast doubt on the pathbreaking importance of the Anglo-French 
treaty.4 They establish that trade liberalization, measured by the crude 
“tariff revenue divided by total import value,” actually made much 
more progress before 1860 than was generally believed, and suggest 
that it might have slowed down after 1860. In response to their  
results, Markus Lampe highlights that many commodities, especially 
agricultural goods, which otherwise figure very prominently in the 
historiography of market integration in the nineteenth century, were 
almost absent from the treaties. The bilateral treaties were instead 
focused on reducing trade barriers for manufactured goods. In these 
sectors, duties had been much higher than on raw materials and  
semi-manufactures well into the 1850s.5 However, Lampe focuses 
almost exclusively on Europe, even if he observes that U.S. tariffs on 
manufactured goods clearly went up in the same period.  
 Most comparative studies focus on agricultural tariffs or price 
differentials or an unclear mix of prohibitive, protective, and  
revenue-oriented tariffs as reflected by “average tariff measures,” and  
 
1 Bairoch, Commerce exterieur and “European Trade Policy”; Nye, “Myth” and War;  
Irwin, “Multilateral” and “Free Trade”; and O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization. 
2 Williamson, “Impact”; Sharp, “1846”; and Federico, “Corn Laws.” 
3 Pahre, Politics. 
4 Accominotti and Flandreau, “Bilateral Trade Treaties.”  
5 Lampe, “Bilateral Trade Flows” and “Effects.” 
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to a large extent start in 1870. This article identifies the timing of 
nineteenth-century liberalization and the extent of initial protectionism 
by measuring the level of tariffs on a representative set of manufactured 
goods in 41 countries and dependent territories around the world 
between 1846 and 1880. While ultimately we would like to establish 
tariff levels for agricultural, mining, and manufactured goods since  
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, this research starts with manufacturing 
goods and in 1846. 
 Even if concerns about agriculture were major obstacles to  
trade liberalization until the 1840s, protectionist arguments dealt with 
protecting manufactures to help domestic industrialization. Moreover, 
there is little in the literature on trade and development since Friedrich 
List about a protectionist “learning” period for agricultural producers.6 
Although industrialization only spread to some “Western” countries  
in the nineteenth century, domestic production of manufactured goods 
such as textiles, metals, leather, or paper took place all over the world. 
The tariff structure for these articles, especially for more skill-intensive 
products, had a major influence on the future competitiveness and 
comparative advantage of domestic manufacturing.7  
 Manufacturing was central to protection even though it accounted  
for less than half of total trade in the emerging world economy.8 In the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century, agrarian primary products  
and minerals had very low tariffs and only some products of tropical 
agriculture, as well as those converted into alcoholic beverages, were 
taxed heavily in European countries. Therefore, although by omitting 
agriculture and mining we do not tell the whole story, we do contribute 
a decisive piece of evidence on the evolution of tariffs in the period 
under study. We would have preferred tracing out the full process  
of the dismantling of mercantilist policies—all the way back to the 
Napoleonic Wars. Unfortunately information on manufactures’ tariffs 
before 1846 is very limited. It thus seemed better to err on the side  
 
6 See Bairoch, Economics, pp. 17–18, 23, who discusses agricultural protectionism in the 
“Golden Era of European Free Trade,” including the arguments of List’s The National System of 
Political Economy (1841). 
7 Recent works on the relation between tariffs and growth in the late nineteenth century 
(Tena-Junguito, “Bairoch Revisited”; Schularick and Solomou, “Tariffs”; and Lehmann and 
O’Rourke, “Structure”) have shown that, if there is a relationship at all, what mattered for long-
run growth were tariffs on manufactures, especially skill-intensive products. 
8 In the 1870s manufactured goods accounted for 40 percent of the imports of the 
Northwestern European core of the world economy and its European periphery, for 60 percent 
of imports in non-European countries, but only for 20 percent of imports in the protectionist 
United States (Yates, Forty Years, tables A.18 and A.22, pp. 226, 230). We should be aware  
that trade in bulk foodstuffs in mid-nineteenth century was still largely an intra-European affair 
(ibid., p. 61).  
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of caution and not to include dispersed evidence into a data set that  
was constructed to provide the largest possible degree of homogeneity 
across countries and over time.  
 Our new database includes more than 7,500 data points covering  
23 manufactured products, grouped in 11 categories, in 41 countries, 
colonies, and dominions for selected years between 1846 and 1880. The 
data set was compiled from the collection of Parliamentary Reports on 
Foreign Duties (British Board of Trade) and other Parliamentary Papers 
for several years which capture the changes in specific and ad valorem 
duties on manufactured products around the world. Specific duties were 
converted into ad valorem rates by applying British export prices.  
 British export prices were set in an open competitive market,  
and presumably to the standard product variety produced and traded 
internationally—they are the closest possible equivalent to a world 
market price. For other countries, comparable average prices are either 
not available (in particular for the “open” but less developed countries 
of the period) or likely to be influenced by the level of protection  
that distorted demand for product varieties through the tariff structure.9 
In general, in view of the limitations of disaggregated price data of 
sufficient quality for all countries in our sample, we focus on measuring 
the levels and changes of tariffs that representative exporters were 
confronted with. We want to leave aside their impact on domestic prices  
and incentives as might be possible in recent fully specified general 
equilibrium measures of manufacture protection.10 Our approach 
connects closely to the classic comparative works of the Board of 
Trade, the League of Nations, and Heinrich Liepmann.11 
 Although our data are mainly drawn from British sources, we believe 
the figures are representative of the trade barriers that confronted  
the manufactures’ exporters of most countries. Since we do not know 
the relative weight of our 11 industries in world commerce, this article 
focuses on presenting unweighted averages over commodity groups  
for each country. We ranked the 11 industrial sectors for which  
we calculate ad valorem equivalents according to their relative skill 
 
9 Cf. the comment by Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,” esp. p. 800, on Irwin and Temin, 
“Antebellum Tariff,” regarding the difference in the average price of cottons exported from 
Britain and imported into the United States. Prices in trade statistics outside Britain were  
often not market, but “official” prices (Lampe, “Bilateral Trade Flows,” pp. 97–100) and only 
recorded for effectively imported product varieties (thereby not taking into account items 
with prohibitions, which were relatively manifold, for example for low-quality textile varieties 
in the 1840s and 1850s). 
10 Anderson and Neary, “Welfare”; and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, “Estimating Trade 
Restrictiveness.” 
11 Board of Trade, Import Duties and Comparative Incidence; League of Nations, Tariff Level 
Indices; and Liepmann, Tariff Levels. 
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intensity following Tena-Junguito’s approach.12 Here we focus mostly 
on the overall picture and only comment briefly on trends in dispersion 
and skill bias of tariffs.  
 Overall, even excluding Britain, there was significant and 
geographically broad trade liberalization in the world before Cobden-
Chevalier. Indeed, average tariffs fell during the 1850s, although  
little of it happened in Northwestern Europe. Subsequently, Cobden-
Chevalier affected a substantial share of world trade and reinforced 
previous unilateral liberalization trends. Nevertheless, the incidence  
of treaty-making in the 1860s and early 1870s on manufactures tariffs 
seems to have been an exclusively European phenomenon. Thus, on  
the one hand, our view of trade liberalization is more optimistic  
about the period after 1846 than the conventional view as offered  
by Bairoch, Irwin, and others, who downplay liberalization before  
Cobden-Chevalier. On the other hand, we show how bilateralism after 
Cobden-Chevalier served to maintain this earlier liberalization dynamic: 
countries that did not take part in the 1860s treaty network did not 
further decrease their levels of protection. The movement to free trade 
in the middle decades of the nineteenth century required a sequence of 
different instruments.  
 
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WORLD TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
 
 The best account of nineteenth-century manufacturing tariffs is  
still that of Bairoch. He shows that after the Napoleonic Wars, most 
European countries had either high levels of protection (Denmark, the 
United Kingdom) or straightforward prohibitions on most manufactured 
goods (Austria, France, Russia, Spain, and Sweden). Outside 
Europe, Japan was still under its Sakoku regime of seclusion and  
the United States had moderately high tariffs. The only exceptions to 
the high protection rule were the Netherlands (including Belgium), 
Switzerland, and Prussia; there ad valorem equivalents of customs 
duties below 15 percent prevailed. By 1875 the United Kingdom had 
moved to completely free trade in manufactures. It was imitated by 
many other European countries who enacted very low ad valorem 
equivalents of customs duties (basically the same countries with low 
tariffs in 1820 plus Sweden), or at least moderate levels below 20 
percent (Austria, Denmark, France, Russia, and Spain). Outside Europe, 
 
12 Tena-Junguito, “Bairoch Revisited,” uses 16 different sectors. See note 35 for a more 
detailed discussion. 
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Japan became almost a free trader, while the U.S. duties increased both 
during the Civil War and afterwards.13 
 What happened between 1820 and 1875? In the United Kingdom,  
the political debate between free trade and protection began with  
the end of hostilities in Europe. At first centered on agricultural 
commodities, that is, important inputs for labor during the countries’ 
industrialization. The Corn Law of 1815 had prohibited the import of 
wheat and marked the beginning of a conflict between the interests  
of agriculture and industry that marked the following decades not  
only in Britain but on the Continent as well. However, British export 
manufacturing interests were recognized by the Board of Trade as 
shown by the Reciprocity of Duties Act (1823) that established 
reciprocal agreements with foreign governments for MFN treatment  
of goods and shipping. Irwin supports the idea that all these efforts  
failed and frustration and discouragement set the stage for the unilateral  
tariff reforms in the early 1840s that culminated with the repeal of  
Corn Laws in 1846.14 Unilateral conversion to free trade in Britain  
was not complete because, during the 1840s and 1850s (and also 
afterwards), imports of exotic products such as tea, tobacco, sugar, 
coffee, and wine and spirits, were still very heavily taxed representing 
more than half of total British tariff revenue. The same was true  
for France.15 Furthermore, as Nye pointed out, Britain maintained  
high tariffs on French wines and spirits.16 Britain’s policy was to refuse 
discriminatory bargaining practices. Instead it offered immediately  
all other countries the benefits of the bilateral negotiations that led to 
the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty. In those negotiations the British did offer 
cuts in a restricted number of dutiable goods, such as ironware, leather 
articles, silk wares, and of course wine, thereby seducing the French.17 
 What was the influence of British liberalism on the Continent before 
Cobden-Chevalier? Apparently, British liberalization and the significant 
reduction of transport costs following the development of railways, 
telegraphs, and shipping industries fostered foreign trade in the rest of 
Europe. As Bairoch points out, “The Continent’s volume of exports, 
which had grown by 1.9 percent per annum between 18371839 and 
1845/46, increased by 6.1 percent per annum between 18451847 and 
18571859. For this reason, these years were one of the three most 
 
13 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” aptly summarized in Bairoch, Economics, chaps. 2 and 
3, in particular table 3.3, p. 40. This table also has Italy as a country with average manufacturing 
tariffs below 10 percent in 1875, but lacks comparable data for 1820. 
14 Irwin, “Multilateral,” p. 94, following Brown, Board of Trade, p. 132. 
15 Tena-Junguito, “Assessing the Protectionist Intensity,” p. 107. 
16 Nye, “Myth” and War. 
17 Lampe, “Effects,” p. 1015. 
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favorable periods for export growth in the nineteenth century.”18 
Bairoch and Irwin mention a few examples of trade liberalization during 
the 1850s: the United States, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Switzerland, as well as Sweden and Belgium from 1856/57 onwards. 
These two authors, however, overlook the fact that commerce might 
have been spurred by the spread of free trade in Continental Europe.19 
Charles P. Kindleberger highlighted long ago that liberalization on  
the Continent drew on the British example and Cobden’s European 
travels.20 
 In a recent provocative paper, Accominotti and Flandreau challenge 
the validity of the conventional chronology of nineteenth-century trade 
liberalization. They “suggest that there was a period of unilateral pan-
European trade liberalization, between 1830 and 1860.” In their view, 
this process was probably more effective than the new instruments of 
the 1860s, bilateral trade treaties.21 
 Outside Europe, the story of almost uniform liberalization between 
1815 and 1875 requires qualification. In Latin America, most former 
colonies gained independence after the Napoleonic Wars. Subsequently, 
they moved away from the mercantilist preferential system and a 
regional custom union to a more open trade policy. This change 
reflected both British military and political assistance during their wars 
of independence moved and the power of pro-commerce coalitions by 
merchants and plantation owners involved in tropical export trade.22 
Nevertheless, state-building and recurring wars required fiscal revenue, 
which these countries’ low population densities was heavily dependent 
on the taxation of foreign goods arriving into the nation’s ports.23 
Setting tariffs to revenue-optimal levels was, in the words of Victor 
Bulmer-Thomas, “an art, not a science. Furthermore, the existence of 
numerous tariffs set at different rates—typically between 15 percent and 
100 percent—on goods competing with domestic production gave 
ample scope for special pleading.”24 Thus, while the discriminatory 
Spanish colonial system was quickly dismantled, subsequent tariff 
reforms left ample scope for local interest groups in industry and 
handicrafts that could exploit the protectionist side of tariff duties 
originally increased to raise revenue, leading to increasing protection  
of domestic manufacturing in the small, but growing markets of  
 
18 Bairoch, Economics, p. 22. 
19 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy” and Economics; and Irwin, “Multilateral.” 
20 Kindleberger, “Rise of Free Trade.” 
21 Accominotti and Flandreau, “Bilateral Trade Treaties.” 
22 Bairoch, Globalization, pp. 41–42. 
23 Bértola and Williamson, “Globalization”; and Centeno, “Blood.” 
24 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, p. 33. 
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Latin American countries. A prominent example is the protection  
of the textile industry in Mexico, where initially revenue-oriented  
tariffs soon were accompanied by numerous non-revenue generating 
import prohibitions.25 While comparative evidence on the evolution of  
tariff rates is scarce, it seems that commercial policy was much  
more domestically driven than in Europe, where liberalization gained 
pace through mid-century bilateralism, while the extent of commercial 
negotiations after the dismantling of the mercantilist system actually 
slowed down in Latin America.26 These observations are actually similar 
to the evolution of tariffs in the United States, where commercial  
policy after the American War of Independence was motivated by both 
separation from the British colonial system and considerations in favor  
of promoting domestic industrialization in conflict with the interests of 
export-oriented plantation owners in the South.  
 Many other formally independent countries could not formulate their 
commercial policy on their own. Most notably, China, Japan, Turkey 
and Persia practiced more or less voluntarily an “enforced commercial 
liberalism,”27 meaning that they had tariffs not very different from those 
of free trade countries like Britain or the Netherlands. Direct military 
pressure or defeat led to liberal tariff regimes in China due to the 
Nanking treaty with Britain in 1842 and in Japan following the arrival 
of the famous U.S. expedition led by Commodore Perry in 1853. Others 
like Turkey or Persia committed themselves via free trade treaties to 
abolishing monopolies and prohibitions, thereby reducing tariff rates to 
very modest levels.  
 In most of the rest of the world, direct intervention through 
colonialism was predominant, and policies here also were marked  
by the dismantling of mercantilist policies. British colonial trade policy 
in the nineteenth century before 1846/49 underpinned a reciprocal 
preferential system and shipping monopoly between metropolis  
and colonies. The regime discriminated against foreign powers, as 
evidenced by the Indian example where more than 99 percent of total 
imports came from Britain and its other colonies. After 1846 and the 
repeal of the Navigation Acts, something similar to a free trade period 
began for most colonies, leading to “an open door policy […]. But  
from this date, the difference in trade policy between the so-called 
Crown colonies and the self-governing colonies (Canada, Australia,  
 
25 Salvucci, Textiles; and Clemens and Williamson, “Why were Latin American Tariffs?” 
There is similar evidence for Argentina, Colombia, and Peru in Bulmer-Thomas, Economic 
History, p. 33. 
26 Pahre, Politics, pp. 366–67. 
27 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” p. 155 and Globalization, p. 41. 
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and New Zealand) became much more important. Most of these self-
governing colonies did not follow the British road to liberalism and 
adopted relatively protectionist trade policies.”28 While tariffs for most 
British colonies were set at low rates and remained so during the rest of 
the nineteenth century, the initially very low rated of self-governing 
colonies—between 2 and 6 percent—changed from the mid-1850s in 
Australia—especially in Victoria—, but also in Canada, where there is 
also evidence of industrial protectionist tariffs being levied in those 
years.29  
 This short review of the literature on trade policy marks the agenda 
for the remainder the article: Some countries exhibit a liberalizing trend 
following from the dismantling of mercantilist Old Regime institutions, 
but the process has different degrees depending on the need propensity 
to protect domestic manufacture and to raise revenue. Thus both levels 
and extent of liberalization seem to differ substantially across countries. 
Therefore, in the following section, we group the different countries  
into “clubs” and compare levels and trends in tariff levels. Thereby we 
establish a more systematic picture than the existing literature, both 
regarding sample size and granularity and comparability of tariff-level 
estimates. 
 
A NEW DATABASE ON MANUFACTURING TARIFFS AROUND THE 
WORLD 
 
 Nearly all previous quantitative studies on trade liberalization in the 
nineteenth century have used evidence on grain tariffs, average tariffs, 
import/GDP ratios, or trade growth, the work by Bairoch discussed  
in the previous section being the only major exception. Therefore,  
they do not offer micro-evidence for exogenous comprehensive  
trade liberalization. Only Lampe develops a database for tariffs on 
manufactured products for seven countries in selected years during the 
period 1859–1875.30  
 To construct a comprehensive data set of tariffs on manufactured 
goods around the world, we take advantage of the British government, 
especially the Board of Trade’s interest in trade institutions around  
the world. It lead to the publication of large surveys on the state  
and evolution of foreign commercial legislation in Parliamentary  
 
28 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” pp. 110, 137; see also O’Brien, “Intercontinental Trade,” 
p. 80. 
29 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” pp. 148–49. 
30 Lampe, “Bilateral Trade Flows” and “Effects.” For the construction of a variable, this work 
was extended to 15 European countries in Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-Century Bilateralism,” 
but the tariff rates have not been published separately. 
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Papers from the collection compiled in John MacGregor’s five- 
volume Commercial Statistics published in 1850, to the famous  
1903 Memorandum (with Tabular Statements) on the Comparative 
Incidence of Foreign and Colonial Import Tariffs on the Export Trade 
of the United Kingdom.31 These reports provide exhaustive tables  
on foreign manufacturing tariffs by countries and products. The data 
presented here for individual years between 1846 and 1880 are mainly 
based on a report prepared by the Board of Trade under Sir Robert 
Giffen on Rates of Duty (foreign and colonial) on British Manufactures 
or Produce in a large number of countries and colonies in 1860/61, 
1870, 1875, and 1880. The data were extended back to 1846 using 
MacGregor, his underlying reports in the Parliamentary Papers, several 
updates of the latter, as well as data compiled by contemporary authors, 
original trade statistics of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and the Zollverein, and information from Prussian official 
sources in their official commercial periodical Preussisches Handels-
Archiv, often compiling information from similar publications in other 
countries.32 
 Using these sources allowed us to fully cover the trade regimes for 
our 11 commodity groups (see Table 1) for almost all countries in most 
of the benchmark years 1846, 1853, 1859, 1863, 1870, 1875, and 1880. 
Our database also contains many data points for years between these 
benchmark years, but we have not used them at this stage to ensure  
full comparability over time. However, in the future we hope to be  
able to provide complete time series, a task that basically depends on 
identifying the date (year) of the modification of all individual tariff 
rates covered in the benchmark years.  
 The “britanocentrism” of our sources implies that the rates we report 
are for British manufactured products. This is important for 1846, when 
the preferential system for British products in the colonies was still  
in force. Even then the impact would be modest, as preferential tariffs  
for British colonies were abolished between 1849 and 1853. Bilateralism 
returned after 1860, when treaties following Cobden-Chevalier established 
“conventional tariffs” (based on “tariff conventions,” that is, bilateral 
treaties) that were lower than the “autonomous tariffs,” a country’s 
 
 
31 Board of Trade, Comparative Incidence. 
32 The different reports in the Parliamentary Papers can be identified from the Subject 
Catalogue by Cockton, category: “Trade and Commerce. Import and Export Duties. Tariffs.” 
Additional sources were Hübner, Zolltarife and Zolltarife Zweite Auflage; and Lack, French 
Treaty, for Latin America, we additionally crosschecked our information with De la Cuadra, 
“Antecedentes,” for Chile, Kuntz Ficker, El comercio exterior, and Cruz Barney, El comercio 
exterior, for Mexico, and Laurent, Contrabando, pp. 282–83, 288, 317, for Colombia. 
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TABLE 1 
CONSTRUCTION OF PRICE SERIES 
Sectors with Complete Price Series, 18461880 
Woolen manufactures: Woolen piece light all wool; Worsted stuffs all wool; Woolen flannels 
Linen manufactures: Linen piece goods 
Cotton manufacture: Cotton piece bleached; Cotton piece printed 
Woolen yarns: Worsted yarn 
Linen yarns: Linen yarns unbleached 
Cotton yarns: Cotton thread for sewing 
Iron and steel: Pig iron; steel bars, angles, shapes 
Sector with Incomplete Price Series Data Available 
Paper Paper hangings; paper for writing  18541880 
Leather Calf skins 18541880 
 Boots and shoes of leather 18621880 
Copper Copper ingots, cakes, slabs 18541880 
Silk manufactures Silk, thrown;  18461870 
 Silk manufactures 18461860 
Note: The missing data are extrapolated using a variety of Sauerbeck’s indices. The paper  
series and leather series are extrapolated back using the “Grand Total Index” in Sauerbeck, 
“Prices”, app. D, p. 648; For copper prices, the “Copper” series, ibid., app. C, no. 22, p. 645 was 
used. Prices for silk, thrown were extrapolated to 1880 using the “Silk” series; ibid., app. C., no. 
34, p. 646. Prices for silk manufactures were extrapolated based on our series of “Silk, thrown” 
for years with missing data. 
Source: See the text. 
 
customs legislation imposed on non-treaty partners’ imports. As Lampe 
has shown, fears of discrimination accelerated the spread of bilateralism 
after 1860, so that the unconditional most-favored-nation clause quickly 
generalized the benefits of initially bilateral treaties. At most then, a 
country’s exporter would have had to wait until 1870 to experience the 
lower rates available to British exporters in 1863.  
 In most places and years, tariffs were imposed as either ad valorem 
rates or as specific duties even though sometimes they appeared as a 
combination of both (see Table 2).33 Specific duties were denominated 
as monetary values for a certain national unit measure of volume,  
 
33 A special, and problematic case, are ad valorem rates that were imposed and reported in the 
sources we use, but where the value could be subject to changing fixed values stipulated by local 
or national authorities, so they were not necessarily levied on the actual value of a product. This 
meant that rates in practice were more specific than ad valorem, the ad valorem rate in the tariff 
scheme being only a rough orientation. This system can be found in some Latin American and 
other peripheral countries and was practiced because authorities did not believe in the invoice 
values reflecting the actual price of the product. MacGregor, Commercial Statistics, (or the 
consuls whose reports he transmits) repeatedly highlights arbitrary valuation procedures in 
backward countries; see, for example, about Greece, ibid., vol. II, p. 190, and about Morocco, 
ibid., p. 288: “The import duties are sometimes arbitrarily raised, and they are often corruptly 
levied; but 10 percent on the value is the general rate of import duty: the value is, however, 
often underrated, by means of bribes or otherwise.”  
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area or weight for which English equivalents were usually provided.34 
Thus the first challenge was to convert these specific duties into ad 
valorem equivalents comparable across countries and over time. Doing 
so requires prices. Given the number of products involved, we could  
not match specific duties with prices perfectly. First, we organized the  
data into 11 sectors following recent work by Tena-Junguito.35 These 
sectors represent the bulk of manufactures traded and span products of 
different skill intensities. Secondly, we collected the quantities and 
values of exports from the British trade statistics for the corresponding 
products or groups from 1846 to 1880. Thirdly, we computed implicit 
prices (unit values) for all these products (23 in total) and averaged 
them out within each sector. Fourthly, we extrapolated some price series 
back to 1846 or forward to 1880 using Augustus Sauerbeck’s series.36 
Finally, we divided all specific duties by their respective prices or, 
whenever missing, by their respective average sector prices.37  
 We acknowledge that by applying British export prices, we bias the 
ad valorem tariffs upwards. Indeed, using British prices assumes that 
the F.O.B/C.I.F. price differential was low for most manufactured 
products according to recent estimates, which is justified by their  
above average value-to-weight ratio.38 In addition, it is far from 
 
34 The main exception are textile duties specified for yards (or varas) of cloth instead of  
units of weight. Here, we follow, Board of Trade, Comparative Incidence, p.170: “After careful 
inquiry, an average weight of 5 yards to the lb. has been assumed. In the same way an ‘average 
count’ of 40 has been assumed for cotton yarns. In the case of woolen and worsted piece goods 
average weights have been estimated varying from 18 ozs. to the yard for heavy broad woolen 
piece goods and worsted coatings, to 5 ozs. to the yard for mixed worsted stuffs. Linen piece 
goods have been taken as 35 lbs. to the 100 yards.” 
At different points in time, Victoria and New Zealand had duties (or “registration fees”)  
per cubic foot on several items. We have decided to use British standard transport/stowage 
conversion rates for light goods of 50 cubic feet to the ton to convert this volume measure into 
weight (Stevens, On the Stowage, pp. 31, 303, etc.).  
35 Actually, comparing to Tena-Junguito, “Bairoch Revisited,” five groups were excluded due 
to lack of data: ships, machinery and hardware, chemicals, apparel, and jute and hemp. For 
chemicals (bleaching powder and alkali) and hemp, we have prices, but dealing with the tariff 
rates was problematic. Both problems reflect the fact that most of the products included in these 
categories were relatively unimportant in international trade before 1880. 
36 Sauerbeck, “Prices.” 
37 See Online Appendix A.1 for a complete data set on prices. 
38 Federico and Tena-Junguito have estimated for their ongoing research project on The 
Growth of World Trade, 18001940 cif-fob conversion ratios for manufactures (including 
insurance) between 1848 and 1880 for 12 different shipping routes in four different continents. 
The average cif-fob differential for the whole period in the world would be 4.2 percent (with  
a minimum of 3.2 percent and a maximum of 6.9 percent during the period). The average 
differentials for regional areas would be 4.2, 3.9, 4.3, and 4.3 percent for Europe, Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America, respectively. The estimates are based on Angier’s general U.K. manufacture 
outbound freights in Fifty Years’ Freights. This series indicates a stable conversion ratio of 1.5 
between freight rates for manufactures and those for coal for different international destinations. 
Coal freight rates have been transformed into freight rate series for manufactures from 
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clear whether ad valorem tariffs were always levied on C.I.F. prices, or 
whether F.O.B. invoice values were sometimes used. As noted in  
the introduction, this implies that our data set is a better measure of  
barriers for exporters than of protection for import-competing domestic 
producers. 
 Our main argument for the use of British export prices is that they 
offer better relative price estimates than the more or less arbitrarily 
fixed import values reported in many official statistics of less- 
developed countries. As we noted earlier, they are also less distorted by 
trade barriers than the import prices of countries that applied tariff  
barriers against British manufactures or prohibited the importation of  
a significant number of product varieties, as was the case for example  
in France before 1860.39 Finally, British export prices do correspond 
best to the product variety/quality for which we have collected specific 
tariffs, so that we see no viable alternative to using them if the data  
set is expected to be consistent over time and comparable between 
countries. 
 Additionally, some countries, namely Spain and Mexico, imposed 
prohibitions on entire commodity groups.40 Without assigning them 
some tariff level, we could not include them in our estimates of average 
protection, leading to downward-biased estimates of their levels of 
protection. However, there is evidence that these prohibitions, as well  
as very high “super tariffs,” induced smuggling in many countries such 
as Colombia, Mexico, and Spain, thereby partially neutralizing their 
formal purpose.41 Since our main objective is to measure exogenous 
changes in commercial policy, not endogenous changes in the effects of 
protectionism, we assigned a rate of twice the specific or ad valorem 
 
18481880 by dividing them by the U.K. export cotton yarn unit value and adding insurance, 
assumed to be 2 percent of value in 1900 and moved backwards with their respective shipping 
freight rates by route (for the insurance of British cotton exports in the 1850s, see Llorca-Jaña, 
“To Be Waterproof.” 
39 See Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,” on U.S. cottons and Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-
Century Bilateralism,” app. 2, on prohibitions. 
40 Prohibitions (substituted with twice the specific or ad valorem rate in the first period after 
repeal). The rate given below is the one included for our calculations in current prices Mexico: 
Leather: 1846: 283 percent, 1853: 265 percent; Copper: 1846: 145 percent, 1853: 145 percent; 
Cotton Yarns: 1846: 213 percent, 1853: 220 percent, Spain: Leather: 1846: 116 percent; 
Cottons: 1846: 200 percent; and Cotton Yarns: 1846: 224 percent. 
41 During the years 18461860 around 50 percent of total imports into Spain from Britain 
were smuggled from Gibraltar and Portugal (see the estimate made by Prados de la Escosura, 
“El comercio hispano-británico,” p. 151). It is difficult to evaluate the effects of prohibitions 
(with high smuggling repression) and extremely high tariffs (with low smuggling repression)  
on changes of real protection during these years. For the case of Colombia, see Laurent, 
Contrabando.  
13
    
  
 
 
rate for the first period when imports were allowed, for all prohibitions. 
In other words, we take abolishing a prohibition to be equivalent to 
halving a prohibitively high tariff. This approach was inspired by a 
circular of the Spanish customs authorities (5 July 1864), which decided 
—that while the import of knitted cottons was prohibited, when they 
were declared bona fide for importation, they could be imported paying 
twice the duty for the corresponding woven cottons.42  
Another problem stems from the extremely high tariff rate calculations 
which arise from prohibitions of imports of lower value items in a 
commodity group (such as low count cotton yarn in France before 
Cobden-Chevalier and many items in Russia before 1859), while tariffs 
apply to high-value varieties but are divided by the relatively low  
unit value of British exports.43 If our calculated duties were higher than 
300 percent, we have applied a cap and set the value to 300 to avoid 
distortions. In all, this involved coding of equivalents of nine prohibition 
data points and application of the 300 percent cap in nine cases, all 
heavily clustered in 1846 and 1853 and in few countries.44  
 From the rates obtained for the 11 individual groups, we have 
calculated unweighted average tariffs for each county by period, following 
the tradition of the Board of Trade itself, the League of Nations, and 
Liepmann.45  
 The database covers a wide geographical area, encompassing most 
regions of the world. Its 41 countries and dependencies were organized 
into six groups: “Rich Europeans,” “Poor Europeans,” “Independent 
New Settlers” (that is, United States), “Semi-Independent New Settlers” 
 
42 Preussisches Handels-Archiv 1864/II, p. 189: “Verzollung gewirkter baumwollener 
Waaren in Spanien (Mon. univ. Nr. 224).” We have tried to solve the problem in other ways, for 
example, using price differentials or examining British exports to countries with very high 
tariffs in the corresponding years. Unfortunately, trustworthy data for international price 
comparisons between peripheral countries and trade with them in the first periods of our  
data set (1846/1853) is too scarce. This also renders more systematic approaches impossible,  
for example, following Beghin and Yue, “Tariff Equivalent,” or Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, 
“Estimating Trade Restrictiveness,” not to speak of calibrated general equilibrium models. 
43 Ad valorem equivalents higher than 300 percent in current prices where the 300 percent cap 
was applied: France: Cotton Yarns: 1846: 337 percent, 1853: 349 percent, 1859: 331 percent; 
Portugal (1846): Linen Yarns 482 percent; Russia (1846): Iron and Steel 314 percent, Leather 
371 percent, Linens 1467 percent, Cottons 486 percent Russia (1853): Linens 368 percent. 
44 We abstained from trying to estimate the ad valorem equivalent of the Japanese seclusion 
policy before 1859, and also did not calculate equivalents of port use restrictions prior to 
1867/68. 
45 Board of Trade, Import Duties and Comparative Incidence; League of Nations, Tariff  
Level Indices; and Liepmann, Tariff Levels. We have also calculated a weighted average across 
commodities based on British export shares, as reported in Online Appendix A.3. Although 
these British export shares are not necessarily representative of the world’s or each country’s 
demand, they can still be interpreted as a measure of “trade resistance” to British industrial 
exports. 
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(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), “Independent Poor” (Latin 
American countries), and “Dependent Poor” (including colonies and 
independent, but compulsory liberalized countries like China, Japan, 
Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Zanzibar). This classification is arbitrary 
but it follows an explicit criterion: we define as poor those countries 
with a 1870 GDP per capita less than half the United Kingdom’s  
(the richest country in the world), according to Angus Maddison.46  
See below how countries were allocated into these six groups. In the 
following section, we present the unweighted average of the average 
tariffs of each group. Table 2 shows for which countries we have full 
data and in which of our seven benchmark years.  
 When aggregating all countries into a world average, we have opted 
for the calculation of a weighted average, using shares of world trade  
or population in 1879. Each country’s share in world imports in 1879 
according to Robert Giffen.47 This is the most detailed estimation of the 
geographical division of world trade (including colonies) for the period 
under study, and a better alternative to the conventional contemporary 
GDP estimations, at least in the case of poor countries. Each country’s 
share of world population was taken from Maddison.48 All in all, our 
database permits an evaluation of tariff protection around the world 
from 1846 to 1880, thereby highlighting the possible effects of Cobden-
Chevalier, or their absence.  
 
HOW MUCH TRADE LIBERALIZATION HAPPENED IN THE WORLD? 
 
 In this section, we focus on comparing country club and world  
trends in tariff levels and changes between 1846 and 1880, with  
special attention to the periods before and after the Cobden-Chevalier 
Treaty of 1860. Although national episodes are extremely interesting, a 
systematic comparison is outside the scope of the present article.49  
 Figure 1 shows a surprising variety in tariff levels and movements 
between country clubs and over time. It shows that Cobden-Chevalier 
was an exclusively European phenomenon. On the Continent, the 
average tariff moved very little during the late 1840s and 1850s and 
then fell from 23.3 percent in 1859 to 10.6 percent in 1863 and 9.3 
percent in 1870. We can also see that, at least as early as 1853, a trend 
away from high tariff barriers was underway. Moreover, this trend was 
 
 
46 Maddison, World Economy. 
47 Giffen, “Use,” pp. 255–58. 
48 Maddison, World Economy. 
49 The national average rates per country can be found in Online Appendix A.2. 
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TABLE 2 
DATA AVAILABILITY 
“Club” Country Years Missing Tariffs Were 
Rich Europe  
(EuroCore) 
 
 
 
Belgium specific 
Denmark specific 
France specific 
Netherlands both 
Switzerland specific 
Zollverein (Germany) specific 
Independent Settler USA Both/Mix 
Poor Europe  
(EuroPeriphery) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria-Hungary specific 
Greece mostly specific 
Italy 1846, 1853, 1859 specific 
Moldovia-Wallachia/ 
Romania 
ad valorem, 1880: 
specific 
Norway specific 
Portugal specific 
Roman (Papal) States 1875, 1880 specific 
Russia specific 
Sardinia 
1863, 1870, 1875, 
1880 
specific 
Spain specific 
Sweden specific 
Semi Independent Settlers 
 
Australia (Victoria) 
None but  
1846 = NSW 
ad valorem 
Canada ad valorem 
New Zealand specific  
Poor Independent 
 
 
 
 
Argentina (Buenos Aires) 1846 ad valorem 
Brazil mainly ad valorem 
Chile 
1846 specific, then 
ad valorem 
Colombia (New Granada) specific 
Mexico specific 
Peru 
ad valorem, 1880: 
specific 
Uruguay ad valorem 
Venezuela specific 
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TABLE 2 — continued 
“Club” Country Years Missing Tariffs Were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor Dependent  
(including compulsorily 
liberalized independent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
specific (based on 
ad valorem) 
Cuba mainly ad valorem 
Dutch East Indies (Java) 1853 ad valorem 
Hong Kong no tariffs 
India ad valorem 
Jamaica 1846 ad valorem 
Japan 1846, 1853 ad valorem 
Morocco mainly ad valorem 
South Africa ad valorem 
Tunisia 1846, 1853 ad valorem 
Turkey (including Egypt) both 
Zanzibar 
 
ad valorem 
Notes: Moldavia and Wallachia had identical tariff rates before the united as Romania; Sardinia 
refers to all of Piedmont-Sardinia. The last column informs whether tariffs were levied in  
ad valorem (percentage of value) or specific (rate per unit of weight or volume) form. “Both” 
means that some commodities were rated ad valorem, others not. “Mix” means that at least 
some commodities were subject to tariffs that had a specific and an ad valorem component.  
Source: See the text/authors’ own work.  
 
more pronounced in the poorer countries of the European periphery and 
Latin America than in the European core of the world economy. This 
trend towards lower trade barriers was also shared by the United States 
with the relatively liberal 1857 tariff. 
 The impact of Cobden-Chevalier in the European periphery was, 
however, much smaller and limited to some countries (Scandinavia, 
Austria, the Italian States, and, later, Spain). Some of these did not 
liberalize so much through treaties, but by making unilateral reforms 
(especially Spain), while Portugal, Russia, and Greece followed the  
tide only reluctantly or not at all. Also, while the European periphery 
“liberalized” before and after 1860, actual duties remained on average 
much higher (in 1859, 19.5 percent; in 1870, 21.8 percent) than in  
the European core. In fact, tariffs on the southern periphery after  
1860 are similar to those of the European core in 1859. In contrast, 
Scandinavian countries changed from a more peripheral to a more core 
pattern over time and by 1870 their average tariffs had dropped  
all the way to 7.6 percent for Norway and 10.3 percent for Sweden 
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FIGURE 1 
UNWEIGHTED AVERAGE TARIFFS COMPUTED WITH CURRENT AND CONSTANT 
1860 PRICES, 18461880 
Sources: See the Online Appendix A.2 and A.3 for underlying data; 60 percent set as maximum 
for display purposes. Unweighted average over all commodities and countries. 
 
in 1870.50 Italy (8.7 percent) also followed a similar pattern.51 After 
1870 Europeans went in reverse. As a result of national industrialization 
policies, trade protection increased. This time, however, the process was 
more severe in the poorer periphery than in the richer core. There the 
average level only increased to 11 percent in 1880.  
 New Settlers (the United States as well as the increasingly self-
governing British colonies, although to a much lesser degree) and Latin 
American countries (Poor Independent) actually show an increase in 
tariff levels after 1860, clearly indicating that European liberalization, 
including Cobden-Chevalier were of little importance to them. In  
Latin America, average tariffs fell from 50.5 percent in 1846 to about  
30.8 percent in 1863, only to increase again, to 41.1 percent in 1880.  
 
50 On Scandinavia and Cobden-Chevalier, see Lampe and Sharp, “Something Rational.” 
51 Federico and Tena-Junguito, “Was Italy?” 
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These countries were more susceptible to altering their duties to  
meet domestic fiscal imperatives. After years of political instability, 
central governments could only turn to foreign trade support their 
growing fiscal needs. Tariff levels followed political cycles. Finally,  
the colonies, dominions, and formally independent states subject to  
what Bairoch named “compulsory economic liberalism” confirm the 
conventional wisdom. Their average rates were below 10 percent in all 
periods for almost all countries and the impact of self-governance in 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada was small. The Dutch East Indies 
did have a 20 percent average in 1846, and Cuba, a colony of high-tariff 
Spain, was the only one where rates rose from 26 percent in 1846 to 70 
percent in 1880. In fact, Cuba behaves quite like the newly independent 
former Spanish colonies.52  
 Since most nineteenth-century tariffs were specific duties denominated 
in national currencies, it is important to investigate whether tariff 
protection changed over time because of conscious decisions of 
governments to modify these specific duties or whether this process  
was more the result of constant duties and changing prices. When we 
recomputed the average tariffs using prices fixed at 1860—see Figure 
1—a few changes appear. To be sure, the levels change slightly and any 
decline in protection in the European core before 1860 and in the poor 
periphery between 1859 and 1863 disappears. Thus it is likely that  
the increase in textile prices due to the American Civil War helped to 
moderate protection in those years even if governmental policies, rather 
than movements in prices, shaped the picture. 
 One area where prices mattered was textiles, especially cottons. 
Figure 2 shows the comparative evolution of the prices for bleached  
and unbleached and for dyed and printed piece goods of cotton 
manufacture price in our database versus the well-known cotton cloth 
prices collected by Lars G. Sandberg (that should be an average of 
bleached and unbleached and printed and dyed cotton piece goods also 
from British export statistics).53 Sandberg’s price in 1846 and 1853 is 
almost identical to our cotton cloth average prices, but in 1859 it is 
closer to our price for bleached and unbleached cottons, again very 
similar to both in 1863, and once again closer to the latter series in  
 
 
52 Morocco shows averages of 13 to 18 percent before 1860, which are caused by a specific 
rate on iron that leads to an ad valorem equivalent that is much higher than the otherwise 
applied 10 percent rule. 
53 Sandberg, Lancashire, app. D, pp. 252–62, presents what he calls British cotton textile 
exports by countries in values and quantities. This cloth price rate is measured in pounds 
sterling per yard of the ratio sum of United States, France, Brazil, and India respective quantities 
and values.  
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FIGURE 2 
BRITISH COTTON CLOTH EXPORTS PRICES, 18461880 
 (sterling pounds /yard) 
 
Sources: Cotton piece bleached and printed from Online Appendix A.1; “Sandberg total cotton 
cloth” and “Sandberg USA,” that is, average prices for British exports to the United States, from 
Sandberg, Lancashire, appendix D. 
 
1870, 1875, and 1880.54 As expected, the movements of the indices are 
very similar also from 1854 onwards: both peak in 1864 and both fall 
from 1864 to 1870 at same time as cotton tariffs first fall and then rise 
(see Figure 3). 
 On the one hand, as expected, in the 1850s stable cotton prices  
could not provide the impetus for the liberalization of the poor European 
periphery and Latin America. Moreover, in this period reductions in 
cotton tariffs, that is, changes in specific rates stipulated by law, were 
exceedingly rare in the European core before Cobden-Chevalier. That is 
what the “fixed price” column of column Figure 4 shows. This inertia fits 
very well with the conventional accounts of commercial policy history 
for Europe before the outbreak of Cobden-Chevalier bilateralism.55 
 
54 Following Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,” we have included Sandberg’s prices for cotton 
cloth exports to the United States in Figure 3 to show that we are aware of the cotton import 
substitution and demand bias created by the U.S. ad valorem cotton tariff from 1846 onwards 
(and by the minimum valuation before the Walker tariff of 1846). The price differential increase 
between British cotton exports to the United States and to the rest of the world widens 
drastically after the North American Civil War.  
55 See, among others, O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization, p. 38; and Bairoch, 
Globalization, p. 22. 
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FIGURE 3 
AVERAGE TARIFFS ON COTTON MANUFACTURES (PIECE GOODS), UNWEIGHTED 
AND CURRENT VS. FIXED (1860) PRICES, 18461880 
 
Sources: Tariff database underlying our online appendices. See the text. 
 
 On the other hand, Figure 3 shows how the exceptional rise in raw 
cotton prices following the American Civil War magnified the effect of 
decreasing specific tariff barriers. This was especially true in Europe 
where the Cobden-Chevalier network expanded rapidly. The decrease in 
ad valorem equivalents of tariffs on cotton textiles until 1863 was clearly 
more due to an increase in the denominator (prices) than to a fall of 
specific tariffs in the numerator. For other textiles, a similar, though 
smaller, effect also appears. The influence of prices on ad valorem 
protection is also important in the second half of the 1860s when the 
second round of bilateral tariff agreements was probably compensated by 
the large reduction in prices.56  
 
56 Our database prices (see Online Appendix A.1) show for linens and woolens and worsteds 
a more moderate price increase in the early 1860s than for cottons, but both were also affected 
by the impact of the American Civil War.  
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 The foregoing conclusions are subject to one caveat. Because we  
use specific duties in pounds sterling which do not provide data in 
national currencies for all years and countries, we cannot disentangle 
the effect of changes in the exchange rate as a source of protection or 
liberalization during this period. We observe that the exchange rates 
used in the British reports are constant rates which seemed to be based 
on the mint parity between currencies. This implies that the depreciation 
of currencies against the mint parity might have lowered the tariff  
level faced by exporters to that country if the stipulated duties were 
specific. We have not systematically corrected this potential bias for 
two reasons: the first is that accessible exchange rates (as collected  
by Markus Denzel57) are for “cashless payments,” while customs duties 
especially in peripheral countries (for example, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
China) had to be paid in cash, that is with precious metal coins.58 The 
most prominent example is the paper currency issued during the U.S. 
Civil War (greenback dollar). The Legal Tender Act of 1862 defined  
it as legal tender for payment “of all taxes, internal duties, excises,  
debts […], except duties on imports,” which still had to be paid in cash 
(specie dollars). The second reason is that in most countries where 
duties were specific, essentially those in Europe (see Table 2), exchange 
rates were essentially stable. The exceptions to these rules are, to our 
knowledge, Russia and China. In Russia, after 1877, customs duties  
had to be acquitted in gold, (presumably before that they could be  
paid in paper rubles).59 For China, as the world gold-silver price  
started to rise substantially after 1873 (when German and France both 
went on to gold), the Shanghai tael, the silver-based currency used in  
the Maritime Customs Office, slowly lost value relative to the pound 
sterling.60  
 
57 Denzel, Handbook. 
58 Hübner, Zolltarife Zweite Auflage, gives an overview for most countries in the world about 
the modalities of customs duty payments in the mid-1860s. While cash payments were very 
common, some cases are more complicated, for example, in Colombia duties had to be paid in a 
mix of internal and foreign debt certificates and gold and silver coins; see ibid., p. 213.  
59 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” p. 62. If we assume that this depreciation followed  
the sterling-ruble exchange rate quoted in Denzel, Handbook, pp. 37071, and started with the 
Crimean War, then the rates in Online Appendix A.2 should be 44.5 percent instead of 48.8 
percent (1859), 46.3 percent instead of 54.4 percent (1863), 37.7 percent instead of 48.9 percent 
(1870), and 43.3 percent instead of 50.6 percent (1875), while for 1880 we would assume  
the rate to be “at par.” These results are in line with Bairoch’s observation that charging in gold 
increased tariff levels by about 32 percent in 1877, when the credit ruble was more devalued 
than in 1875.  
60 For the commercial gold-silver-rate in London, see Flandreau, Glitter, pp. 6, 243. For the 
official Shanghai tael to pound sterling exchange rates, see Denzel, Handbook, pp. 509–10.  
If we account for depreciation since 1873, the Chinese tariff rates would be slightly lower than 
indicated in Online Appendix A.2: 5.3 percent instead of 5.7 percent in 1875 and 5.6 percent 
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This might also apply to other silver-based currencies such as the 
Mexican peso, for which, however, we lack valid specie-exchange rate 
information. Overall, the effect of changing exchange rates during  
the 1850s and 1860s is small, and after 1870 the spread of the gold 
standard, is important but it would not seriously affect the patterns we 
have found. 
 Returning to Figure 1, it is clear that Cobden-Chevalier was  
an exclusively European phenomenon. Tariff protection decreased in  
both the core of rich countries and with some delay in at least  
some parts of the European periphery. In the rest of the world, trade 
protection evolved in a different way. In the United States, tariff 
barriers actually increased from the late 1850s and early 1860s to the 
1870s. For Latin America, liberalization was a pre-Cobden-Chevalier 
experience and return to protection started as early as the 1860s. Since 
Europe was at the center of the nineteenth-century economy, we need to 
ask what the effect of European liberalization was on world tariffs.  
 Looking at Figure 4, we see that the movements of the “world tariff” 
average are very similar whether we weigh countries by their share  
of world population or of world trade. Before 1860 the “world tariff” 
declined from 49 to 31 percent if weighted by trade shares, and from  
31 to just 17 percent if weighted by population. The differences reflect 
the fact that large parts of the world population lived under regimes of 
“compulsory liberalism,” implying that both the “trade per person” and 
the tariff levels of these territories were below those of richer countries. 
This was particularly true for China and India. By 1870 world levels  
fell to 21 percent if weighted by trade and 15 percent if weighted  
by population. Then from 1870 to 1880 we see a slight increase by 2  
to 4 percentage points. This indicates that there might have been 
“globalization backlash” for manufactures after 1870, but in comparison 
to the (European) reactions to the “grain invasion” it seems to have been 
rather mild.61  
 So, did Cobden-Chevalier matter? If we compare the “members”  
of the Cobden-Chevalier network—defined as those who concluded  
at least three treaties with unconditional most-favored nation clause  
before 1870—to “nonmembers” among the independent countries in our 
sample, the following picture emerges (Table 3).62 
 
instead of 6.4 percent in 1880. For an account of the spread of the gold standard, see López-
Córdova and Meissner, “Exchange-Rate Regimes.” 
61 See O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization, pp. 97–105, and the works cited there for a 
comprehensive discussion of “globalization backlash” in agriculture.  
62 We used the list of contracts by countries in the working paper version of Lampe, 
“Effects,” appendix 1, and count as “members”: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Zollverein (Germany), Austria-Hungary, Italia (Sardinia), Norway, Roman (Papal) States, 
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FIGURE 4 
WORLD TARIFF AVERAGE ON MANUFACTURING TRADE, 18461880 
 
Notes: Weights are shares in total trade and population by countries respectively, in 1879. The 
rates for each country are the unweighted rates.  
Sources: See Online Appendix A.2 and the text.  
 
 Cobden-Chevalier mattered, but liberalization was underway in the 
participating countries at least since 1846. The countries taking part in 
Cobden-Chevalier liberalized more before and during the 1860s than 
the other independent countries in our sample.63 Indeed, between 1859 
and 1870 the average liberalization was larger than that achieved in 
each of the eight GATT rounds between 1947 and 1994.64 At the same 
time, non-treaty countries moved (on average) towards more protection, 
increasing tariffs by 17 percent and 31 percent in 18591870 and 
18701880, respectively. This suggests that there were no simultaneous 
“two ways” to liberalization, and that the movement to free trade 
developed step by step employing different instruments. 
 
Spain, and Sweden; while Denmark, the United States, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela are “nonmembers” 
In 18461859 we do not include Switzerland under Cobden-Chevalier since its calculatory 
increase by 658 percent (from 0.4 to 2.9 percent) was the outcome of a complete change in the 
customs system between 1849 and 1851 that did not actually involve an increase in protection, 
but a unification of the customs territory; see Polli-Schönborn, “Zölle.” 
63 A look at Figure 1 and the underlying data reveals that liberalization was probably faster on 
average among the European periphery countries during the 1850s, while during the 1860s the 
cuts in tariff rates were largest in some of the richer countries. 
64 Jackson, World Trading System, p. 74, gives the average tariff cut on non-primary goods in 
industrial countries as 34 percent to 38 percent between the Geneva and the Uruguay round. 
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TABLE 3 
THE COBDEN-CHEVALIER NETWORK AND THE EVOLUTION OF TARIFF RATES 
Tariff Change, 
18461859 
(%) 
Tariff Level, 
1859 
(%) 
Tariff Change, 
18591870 
(%) 
Tariff Level, 
1870 
(%) 
Tariff Change, 
18701880 
(%) 
Cobden-Chevalier 29 36 48 13 17 
Non Cobden-Chevalier 12 40   17 32 31 
Note: “Tariff changes” are changes in percent, not percent points. 
Source: See Online Appendix A.2 and the text. 
 
STRUCTURE AND DISPERSION OF TARIFFS 
  
 As can be observed from Figures 1 and 3, tariffs for cotton 
manufactures were much higher than the simple average over all 
commodity groups. There are several possible reasons for this. Most 
importantly, countries (outside the British Empire) might have reacted 
to British comparative advantage in textile production by defensively 
protecting their industries. If so they would have biased their tariff 
structure against those products that the British were most desirous of 
selling.65 They might also have been disproportionately protecting 
either those sectors where value added and spillover potential  
were highest (a “positive skill bias” according to Nathan Nunn and  
Daniel Trefler)66 or domestic lobby groups or “national labor” were best 
organized, potentially causing a “negative skill bias.” 
 We can use the detailed information at industry level in our data set  
to shed some preliminary light onto these questions. First, we can look  
at the level of dispersion in tariff rates, that is, their variances across 
commodity groups to see which countries had more diversified tariff 
schemes, potentially reflecting more active commercial policy. Let us 
examine the coefficient of variation, which corrects for the fact that 
countries with high tariffs are also likely to have high variances across 
products. All points in time, European countries, rich and poor(er), 
seemed to pursue a much more active trade policy in the sense that the 
coefficient of variation of their rates is much higher than that of the rest 
in our sample, with Latin American countries and the rich settler colonies 
temporarily approaching European levels in the middle of our period, but 
then decreasing again. This pattern is reflected in the fact that outside 
Europe relatively uniform ad valorem rates across commodity groups 
 
65 This can be seen from a comparison of the British-export weighted rates in Online Appendix 
A.3 with the unweighted averages in Online Appendix A.2: The weighted rates are higher for 
almost all independent countries. 
66 Nunn and Trefler, “Structure.” 
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were much more common than in Europe, where detailed schemes of 
specific duties prevailed. The second step is to look at the level and 
evolution of the “skill bias” over time. For the present purpose, we have 
measured skill bias as the ratio of the average of “high-skill industries”  
to “low-skill industries,” following Tena-Junguito.67 A value above 1 for 
this indicator means that that high-skill industries were more protected 
than low-skill industries, which ceteris paribus hints at a “positive  
skill bias” in the tariff structure. Figure 5 shows that the skill bias  
in current prices was consistently above 1 over the whole period in  
the rich European core, while it was mostly below one in the poorer 
European periphery, especially after 1863, when a clear bias in favor of  
low-skill manufactures becomes visible. For the period 18591870 we 
observe divergent patterns between skill bias measured in current and 
constant prices, indicating contrary movements in relative prices and 
relative nominal protection levels. From 1859 to 1863, in current prices, 
tariffs for low-skill sectors fell faster than those for high-skill sectors both 
in the core and in the periphery, even though pure commercial policy  
did actually lower duties in constant prices faster for high- than for  
low-skilled sectors. Between 1863 and 1870 we see that in both “clubs” 
commercial policy became more inclined towards low-skill sectors, a 
process that was reversed to a certain degree in the Rich European 
countries after 1870, presumably by slightly increasing tariffs for high-
skill industries. In sum, Cobden-Chevalier, despite lowering overall tariff 
levels, did little to change the tariff structure in favor of skill-intensive 
manufactures.  
 For the other clubs, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. After  
the Civil War in the United States, the tariff structure also became  
more inclined towards low-skill industries: the average prewar ratio was 
1.05 and it fell to an average of 0.84 after 1863. Latin American 
countries showed a pattern that consistently favored low-skill over  
high-skill sectors (they average 0.86). The Rich Semi-Independent  
group (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) consistently increased 
their inclination towards more skill-intensive activities (from 0.77 in 
1853 to 1.22 in 1875). The group of the dependent poor shows the 
opposite trend (moving from 1.3 before 1860 to 0.97 after 1870). This 
result, however, is driven mainly by India and Morocco; most countries 
had ratios close to one over the whole period thanks to their “flat rate” 
ad valorem tariffs. 
 
 
67 Tena-Junguito, “Bairoch Revisited,” defines paper, silk manufactures (including thread), 
iron and steel and leather as industries with high-skill intensity, while the corresponding low-
skill sectors are woolen, linen, and cotton yarns and the manufactures (cloth) made thereof. 
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FIGURE 5 
TARIFF SKILL BIAS 
 
Notes: Skill bias calculated as ratio of tariff average for manufactures with high skill-intensity to 
tariff average for manufactures with low skill-intensity (see the text).  
Sources: See the text. 
27
    
  
 
 
 However, the whole complex of skill bias change will require  
much more detailed investigation, since countries at different levels 
of development might rationally choose a tariff structure that first favors 
labor-intensive, low-skill manufacturing over agriculture (and impose 
fiscal tariffs on higher-skill products), medium-skill capital intensive 
manufactures over low-skill sectors or strategic and skill-intensive 
sectors not covered here (for example, machinery, arms, locomotives  
or boats) over industries producing the commodities we define as skill 
intensive.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This article offers a new wider perspective on the evolution  
of worldwide tariff levels on manufactures from 1846 to 1880.  
Previous attempts to measure tariff rates and their changes had been 
limited to some European countries, to protection on agriculture  
or based on the “average tariff” measure which is strongly biased, 
especially in Europe, by changes in fiscal tariffs on product of tropical 
agriculture, alcoholic beverages and the like. Although the data and 
analysis presented in the present article will be extended in the future  
to allow for solid econometric analysis into causal relations between 
liberalization (especially of manufactured goods) and trade expansion in 
different regions of the world as well as explanatory models of the 
“demand side” of liberalization, that is the political economy of tariffs, 
we wish to highlight a number of important findings: 
 Our results show that world trade was increasingly liberalized since 
at least 1846. This makes our view on liberalization is therefore more 
optimistic than the conventional wisdom offered by Bairoch, Irwin, and 
others who are skeptical about significant liberalization outside Britain 
before the wave of bilateral treaties of the 1860s. We find that most 
independent countries in the world liberalized during the late 1840s  
and the 1850s, and that liberalization on a world level continued until  
at least 1870. In the second phase of world tariff liberalization after 
1860, liberalization via Cobden-Chevalier bilateralism was important 
for the reduction of manufactures tariffs in the world, not least because 
the share of the “member” countries of the network in world trade  
(not including the United Kingdom) was about 60 percent (in 1879). 
Furthermore, tariff rates remained low in most of the colonies and 
territories under European influence. In contrast, those independent 
countries not taking part in this wave of treaties on average increased 
their levels of protection. However, since their share in world trade  
was rather small (about 26 percent, most of it by the United States  
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and Russia), their impact on a world scale was relatively small.  
The observed correlation in the 1860s between absence of bilateral  
co-operation to liberalize trade and increasing average tariff rates  
for manufactures constitutes negative evidence that there were no  
two effective paths to liberalization after 1860s, while the positive 
evidence of the European core of the Atlantic economy shows  
that Cobden-Chevalier was an effective instrument to sustain the 
liberalization dynamic underway before 1860.68 
 To conclude, we wish to highlight the general trend of liberalization 
over the whole period, at least until 1870. The world average tariff  
in 1880 was little more than half the 1846 level, no matter if we  
use trade or population as weights. Of the 35 countries covered for  
the whole period (taking Italy as a continuation of Sardinia), 23 had  
lower tariffs on manufactures in 1880 than in 1846. Of the remaining 
dozen, only the United States, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Greece  
had averaged levels above the population weighted world average of  
17 percent in 1880. Therefore, we conclude that British liberalization 
after 1846 was typical rather than exceptional of a general trend of 
dismantling Old Regime mercantilism and decreasing political barriers 
of trade in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.  
 These results reveal something relevant for our knowledge of  
the dynamics of commercial liberalization in the nineteenth century  
which followed a general trend and was not sparked by any kind of 
bilateral or multilateral approach. Rules of all kinds of countries seem  
to have decided that it would be favorable to decrease trade barriers  
for manufactured goods. We believe that given our evidence, the idea 
that liberalization first took part in Britain, for endogenous political 
economy reasons, or the increasing political weight of Enlightenment 
ideas,69 and then spread from overseas, via commercial hegemony,  
the spread of free trade ideology70 or gunboat diplomacy, should be 
revisited. If unilateral liberalization was underway at least since 1846, 
although reinforced by bilateralism during the 1860s, Britain might not 
have been alone in unilaterally questioning the costs of trade barriers, as 
it was not alone in dismantling them. 
 
 
 
68 Why it failed to spread beyond Europe and did not allow for sustained liberalization after 
1870 or 1875 is discussed in detail in Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-Century Bilateralism.”  
69 See Schonhardt-Bailey, Corn Laws, for the former, and Morrison, “Before Hegemony,” for 
an argument from Adam Smith to the evolving political free trade ideology. 
70 Kindleberger, “Rise of Free Trade.” 
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